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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY OLCOTT,
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET,

Appellate Court No,

Defendants-Appellants.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to § 78-2a-3 U.C.A. (as amended 1953).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Defendants owe

Plaintiff $2,315.39 on an insurance application
Plaintiff's summary judgment motion requested

(policy) when

judgment

different amount on a different insurance policy?

for a

Standard of

Review: In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment,
the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to
the losing party below.
(Utah 1991).

Winecrar v. Froerer Corp. , 813 P.2d 104

And in determining whether those facts require, as a

matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party
below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW of
N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
B.

Did the trial err in ruling that Defendants owe plaintiff

the amount of $2,315.39, and signing an Order that states that
Defendants owe Plaintiff the amount of $394.21?

Standard of

Review: In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment,
the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to
the losing party below.
(Utah 1991).

Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104

And in determining whether those facts require, as a

matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party
below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW of
N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
C.

Did the trial court err in finding Defendants owed

anything to Plaintiff where the evidence clearly showed that
Defendants had paid Plaintiff on the first application, and had
neither signed the second application nor had knowledge of it?
Standard of Review:

In considering an appeal from a grant of

summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts in a light
most favorable to the losing party below.
Corp. . 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991).

Wineaar v. Froerer

And in determining whether those

facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the
prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no deference to
the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for
correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah
1989); Schurtz v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
D.
based

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment

on the

first

insurance policy which was not pled
2

in

Plaintiff's complaint?

Standard of review: In considering an

appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below.
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991). In determining
whether those facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of
judgment for the prevailing party below, the appellate court gives
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are
reviewed for correctness.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779

P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108
(Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Defendants are unaware of any determinative constitutional
provisions, statutes or rules.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is a civil case involving two

insurance policies—one on which Plaintiff based its complaint, and
one on which Plaintiff based its summary judgment motion.
B.

Course Of Proceeding And Disposition Below.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this case on February 12, 1986,
and prayed for judgment in the amount of $2,315.39, an amount
Plaintiff alleged was due on insurance premiums (R. at

5) .

On

March 13, 1989, Defendants moved to have the case transferred from
the Fourth Circuit to the Fourth District Court.

(R. at 164) .

On

or about July 27, 1990, the court amended the pleading to name
3

Truck

Insurance

Insurance Group.

Exchange

as Plaintiff,

(R. at 211).

rather

than

Farmer's

Plaintiff filed its first summary

judgment motion on January 3, 1991, requesting judgment based on
the insurance policy at issue in its complaint.
On September 9,

1991, Plaintiff's

(R. at 221, 225) .

first Motion

for Summary

Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment were
denied.

(R. at 357).

On December 11, 1991, Plaintiff filed a second Motion for
Summary Judgment against Defendants, requesting relief based on an
insurance application different than the one on which plaintiff
based its complaint.

(R. at 382) . On May 18, 1992, this case was

transferred back to the Fourth Circuit Court.

(R. at 490).

On

January 11, 1993, the Circuit Court issued a ruling granting
Plaintiff's second Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. at 512).

Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial on January 20, 1993, based
on Rule 59(a) (6) (insufficiency of evidence).

(R. at 514-519. The

order is at 544).
On February 19, 1993, the Circuit Court issued a ruling
denying Defendants' Motion for New Trial.

(R. at 541).

Plaintiff

attempted to submit a Summary Judgment Order which differed in
significant aspects from the ruling the trial court issued. The
most important aspect being that the ruling held Defendants liable
for $2,315.39, while the submitted Order contained the figure $394.
Due to the discrepancies, Defendants filed a Notice of Objection to
Summary Judgment on March 5, 1993. (R at 551).

The trial court, in

an April 1, 1993 memorandum, affirmed its summary judgment and
4

denial of new trial rulings.

(R at 556)

The Summary Judgment

Order was signed on March 25, 1993. (R. at 548).
a Notice of Appeal on April 8, 1993.
C.

Defendants filed

(R. at 561).

Statement of Facts.
1.

On or about November 30, 1984, Olcotts filed an

application for insurance coverage with Truck Insurance Exchange
(TIE) , one of several companies within Farmers Insurance Group, to
cover their business operations.
2.

(R. at 244).

On or about November 30, 1984, the Olcotts executed

an application and agreement with Prematic Service Corporation,
(hereafter "Prematic"), to finance the estimated annual premium for
the insurance coverage applied for through monthly budget payments.
(R. at 218).
3.

Pursuant to their application, the Olcotts issued a

check to TIE on the above date in the amount of $369.59, the
equivalent of two (2) months of the estimated premium (plus $3.59
service charge), pursuant to the agreement with Prematic.

(R. at

249) .
4.

On or about January 7, 1985, the Olcotts issued a

second check to TIE in the amount of $183.00, the equivalent of the
third month's premium pursuant to the agreement with Prematic,
which brought the total premiums paid to $552.59.
5.

(R. at 249).

On or about January 22, 1985, TIE notified the

Olcotts that they were ineligible for the insurance for which they
had applied and that the insurance under that policy would only
continue until February 6, 1985.
5

(R. at 255).

6.

The final paragraph of the Prematic application and

agreement states that the application is presumed accepted if no
notice as to acceptance or otherwise is received within thirty (30)
days from the date signed.
7.

(R. at 248).

The application was signed November 30, 1984 and the

notice of cancellation was given January 22, 1985, fifty-two (52)
days after the application was signed.
8.
policy

(R. at 255 ) .

Because the Olcotts were told that the insurance

(which was a preferred policy) would be canceled after

February 6, 1985, they procured insurance coverage elsewhere (as
advised to do in the cancellation document).
9.

(R. at 255 and 274).

Meanwhile, a second application for an insurance

policy with standard premiums was filled out and submitted..

(R.

at 251) •
10.

The Olcotts were completely unaware of this second

application and did not sign it.

(R. at 290. See also exhibits R

at 282-290).
11.

Plaintiff subsequently made demand upon the Olcotts

for payment of premiums under the second policy with the standard
rates.

(R. at 258).
12.

The

Olcotts,

being

unaware

of

this

second

application for insurance, refused to pay the premiums, as they had
purchased insurance elsewhere.
13.

(R. at 274).

Plaintiff brought suit under the second application,

demanding that Olcotts pay $2,315.39 to plaintiff.
14.

(R. at 5).

On or about January 9, 1991, plaintiff filed a
6

motion for summary judgment asking for the $2,315.39 plaintiff
contended was owed under the second policy (which Defendants had
not signed), as alleged in plaintiff's complaint.

(R. at 221,

225) .
15.

Plaintiff was denied recovery of the $2,315.39. (R„

16.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a second motion for

at 352).

summary judgment asking for the amount of $367.21, the alleged
difference

between

the

quoted

preferred

rate

on

the

first

application for the 69 days of coverage it provided and the rate on
file with the State Insurance Division.
17.

(R. at 382, 385).

The trial court, in ruling on plaintiff's second

motion for summary judgment, ordered that the Olcotts are to pay
plaintiff the amount of $2,315.39, an amount which plaintiff had
asked for and was denied in its first motion for summary judgment,
but had not asked for in the motion which was then before the
court. (R. at 512, 513).
18.

More specifically, the trial court found:
One:
Defendants entered into a commercial
coverage insurance policy with plaintiffs, which
policies are reviewed by their underwriting
department for applicability to the risk and the
rate which is not determined up front as an auto or
homeowners policy would be due to the nature of the
risk and its need for underwriting analysis.
Two:
Defendants were notified by plaintiffs'
underwriting department that the risk could not be
written in the particular subsidiary company at the
rate indicated at the time of binding, but that the
risk could be written in a higher risk company at
that rate.
Three:

Defendant were covered by the plaintiff
7

insurer during this period of communication and a
premium was earned by plaintiff.
Four:
Defendants obtained insurance coverage
from another insurance carrier at a rate more
satisfactory to them.
Five:
The plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid
portion of the insurance premium that they [sic]
claim is owed. In doing so they have billed at the
lower rate of the first, lower risk company. That
amount is $2,315.39, and appears uncontested as to
the amount, but contested as to whether or not is
it [sic] owed. This is the subject matter of this
suit and motion for summary judgment.
(R. at 512, 513).
19.

Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial, but the

motion was denied.

(R. at 514. 519).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendants owe nothing under the first insurance policy
because it is not at issue in this case. Additionally, defendants
owe nothing under the first insurance policy because they paid the
premiums in full for the period for which they were covered.
Plaintiff is bound by the premium quoted by plaintiffs insurance
agent, Mr.

Ken

England,

plaintiff's

agent.

because Mr.

England

Additionally, plaintiff

was

acting

as

is bound by the

prematic application and agreement.
Defendants owe nothing under the second

insurance policy

because it was executed by someone other than defendants without
defendants7

authority.

Defendants

had

no

knowledge

of the

existence of the second insurance policy until nearly six (6) years
after it was allegedly executed.
The lower court's ruling on the summary judgment motion
8

at issue here clearly indicates that court's lack of understanding
of the issues of this case in general, and specifically the issues
contained in the summary judgment motion before the court.

ARGUMENT
I.

DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE FIRST INSURANCE POLICY.
A.

DEFENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE FIRST INSURANCE POLICY
BECAUSE IT IS NOT AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE.

Plaintiff's complaint was brought against Defendants based on
the second insurance application—the one Defendants neither had
knowledge

of

nor

signed.

Plaintiff's

complaint

prayed

for

$2,315.39, the amount Plaintiff claims is owed on the second
policy.

Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that the policy was

cancelled because of non-payment of premiums.
While it may not be clear from a reading of the complaint that
it is in fact the second policy application Plaintiff brought suit
on, a cursory examination of Plaintiff's summary judgment motions
clarifies this issue.
Plaintiff's first summary judgment motion, filed January 3,
1991, asked for judgment based on the second insurance application,
referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint.

As stated by Plaintiff in

it's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 7 (R. at 231):
"TIE contends that the insurance coverage for which an earned
premium is due is related to Application No. 2, received by TIE at
its Pocatello Regional Office on or about January 18, 1985, . . ."
That summary judgment motion was denied.
9

Plaintiff's second summary judgment motion (the basis of this
appeal), filed on December 11, 1991, asked for judgment based on
the first insurance application, which was not the basis of
Plaintiff's complaint.

As stated in Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Support of Summary Judgment: "On or about December 5, 1984, TIE
received at its Pocatello Regional Office Olcott's application for
insurance coverage dated November 30, 1984, (the "Application")
executed by the Defendant John Olcott."

The insurance policy at

issue in the second summary judgment motion was cancelled due to
Defendants' ineligibility, not due to non-payment of premiums (as
alleged in Plaintiff's complaint).

Plaintiff's second summary

judgment motion asked for $367.21, the difference between the rate
given Defendants under the preferred policy and the rate Plaintiff
claimed it was required to pay according to the State schedule.
Plaintiff is clearly referring to two different policies in
its two motions for summary judgment: the first motion asked for
relief based on the second policy (referenced in the complaint),
and the second motion asked for relief on the first policy which
Defendants actually had knowledge of and signed.
In summary, Plaintiff based its Complaint and first summary
judgment motion on the second insurance policy.

The summary

judgment at issue here was based on the first insurance policy on
which Plaintiff has never brought a cause of action. Plaintiff has
never requested payment of the $367.21 it alleges is due on that
policy.

Rule 56(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may,
10

. . . move . . . for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
The basis for Plaintiff's summary judgment motion at issues
here cannot be found in any "claim, counterclaim or cross-claim" or
"declaratory judgment" as it was never pled.

Therefore, summary

judgment based on the first insurance policy was clearly erroneous.

B.

DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE FIRST INSURANCE POLICY
BECAUSE THEY PAID THE PREMIUMS IN PULL FOR THE PERIOD FOR
WHICH THEY WERE COVERED.

At the time Defendants executed the application for insurance,
Plaintiff's insurance agent, Mr. Ken England, provided Defendants
with an estimate of what the insurance would cost Defendants. This
estimate was $2,140.00 per year, which worked out to be a total
payment of $183.00 per month.

(R at 244)

Defendants entered into an agreement, through Mr. England,
with

Prematic

Services

premiums to Plaintiff.

Corporation

to

finance

the

insurance

The final paragraph of the Prematic

application and agreement states that the application is presumed
accepted if no notice of cancellation is received by Defendants
within thirty (30) days from the date signed. The application was
signed November 30, 1984 and the Notice of Cancellation was given
January 22, 1985, fifty-two (52) days after the application was
signed.

Since more than thirty

(30) days had passed before

rejection was received, Plaintiff is bound by the figure used in
the application.
Furthermore, if Plaintiff was owed more money on the cancelled
first policy, it certainly would (or should) have indicated such on
11

the Notice of Cancellation it sent to Defendants, which Defendants
received on or about January 22, 1985.

(R at 255, 256). There is

no mention on the Notice of Cancellation document of any monies due
on the cancelled policy.

It is unreasonable, for Plaintiff to

claim, after six (6) years and much litigation, that Defendants owe
more money on a policy that was cancelled by Plaintiff years
before.
Even if TIE were allowed to adjust the estimate given by its
agent,

allowing

TIE to do

so six years after

the

fact

is

unreasonable, against public policy, and violates the doctrine of
laches. See Anaelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772
(Utah 1983) See also Morgan v. Board of State Landsf 549 P.2d 695
(Utah 1976) J.P. Koch. Inc. v. J.C. Penney Company. Inc.. 534 P.2d
903 (Utah 1975); Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980).

TIE

received the premium payments in December of 1984 and January of
1985.

If TIE were going to adjust the rates and comply with State

law, as it contends it must, it should have done so at that time.
Instead, TIE waited until it was faced with the threat of a
malicious prosecution suit to attempt to exercise it's "right" to
adjust the estimate given six (6) years prior.
Plaintiff has not properly brought a claim for the money it
alleges is owed on the first insurance policy—it has merely tried
to sneak in the back door via its summary judgment motion to
attempt to avoid a malicious prosecution suit by Defendants.
Additionally, Defendants paid three (3) months (or ninety (90)
days) premiums on the policy before it was cancelled, but only
12

actually received approximately sixty-nine (69) days of coverage
under the policy.

Therefore, not only have Defendants paid the

premiums in full on that policy, but Defendants are due a partial
refund for the period for which they paid but were not covered
under the first policy.

1.

PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE PREMIUM QUOTED BY
PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE AGENT, KEN ENGLAND, BECAUSE
MR. ENGLAND WAS ACTING AS PLAINTIFF'S AGENT.

Mr. Ken England, in executing the documents surrounding the
procurement of insurance for Defendants, was obviously acting in
the capacity of Plaintiff's agent. An agency relationship may be
created where actual authority has been conferred to the agent to
act on behalf of the principal.

This authority may be express or

implied.
Express authority exists whenever the principal directly
states that its agent has the authority to perform a
particular act on the principal's behalf.
Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 762 P.2d
1090, 1094 (Utah 1988).
In addition to express authority, agency may also be created
by implied authority.

In order to establish agency by implied

authority, there must be conduct on the part of the principal that
indicates his intention to confer authority, or otherwise cause the
agent to believe that he possesses authority, to act on behalf of
the principal.

Rest. 2d §26. The Utah Supreme Court has stated,

Implied authority, . . ., embraces authority to do those
acts which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual,
and proper to accomplish or perform, the main authority
expressly delegated to the agent. Implied authority is
13

actual authority based upon the premise that whenever the
performance of certain business is confided to an agent,
such authority carries with it by implication authority
to do collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary
incidents of the main act or business authorized. This
authority may be implied from the words and conduct of
the parties and the facts and circumstances attending the
transaction.
Id. at 1094-95. See Bowen v. Olsen. 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978).
Furthermore, Plaintiff also ratified Mr. England/s acts.

In

Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090
(Utah 1988), the Supreme Court discusses ratification.

It held:

A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an
agreement made by an unauthorized agent. Ratification of
an agent's acts relates back to the time the unauthorized
act occurred and is sufficient to create the relationship
of principal and agent.
A deliberate and valid
ratification with full knowledge of all the material
facts is binding and cannot afterward be revoked and
recalled.
Clark at 1098. The Court also held:
When a principal claims the benefits of a contract made
by his agent, he cannot repudiate the acts of this agent
on the ground such acts were unauthorized. Accepting a
contract and claiming the fruits thereof, the principal
takes with whatever taint attaches to its origins.
Clark at 1099. See also Rest. 2d §82 (The essence of ratification
is that the prior unauthorized act is treated as if it has been
authorized by the principal from the outset) ; and Rest. 2d §93
(Ratification results whenever the principal accepts the benefits
or otherwise affirms the conduct of one purporting to act on the
principal's behalf)

(Emphasis added).

Express approval of a

transaction is the clearest evidence of ratification, but consent
can also be found wherever the principal accepts the benefits of
the transaction, as when the principal accepts the proceeds from a
14

sales transaction.

By accepting the proceeds from the sale of an

insurance policy, Plaintiff accepted the benefits and ratified the
transaction carried out by its agent, Mr. England.
Other authorities on agency have stated: "In accordance with
general principles of agency, the insurer is ordinarily bound by
the representations made by its soliciting agents as to the rate of
premium."

5 Couch on Insurance 2d, Premiums, Assessments, Due §

30:13 (1984). In this case Plaintiff's agent made a representation
that the annual premium would be $2,140.00. Based upon this dollar
figure

the

parties

entered

into

a

contractual

relationship.

Plaintiff asked the lower court to impose an additional $2,789.00
(pro rated) burden upon the Defendants. The disparity between the
estimate and the new alleged premiums is not a mere adjustment, but
is a complete rewriting of the contract.

Defendants were not

provided with an opportunity to consent to such a huge distortion
of the original agreement.
While Plaintiff may claim the estimated premium stated on the
Prematic application and agreement to have been a simple mistake,
"[t]he responsibility

for a mistake in the compilation of an

insurance premium, not due to a misrepresentation of an insured, is
upon the insurer, when the insured is not made aware of the mistake
until a claim on the insurance policy is made."

Anderson v.

Dairvland Ins. Co. , 97 N.M. 155, 637 P.2d 837 (1981).

Although no

claim was made on the policy in question, Defendants were not
notified

of

cancelled.

the

disparity.

Rather, the

(R. at 255).
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policy

was

simply

Where a premium finance company is not aware that an estimate
is anything other than a reliable estimate, an agent binds the
insurance company by his or her representations.

Allston Finance

Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co.. 18 Mass. App. 96, 463 N.E.2d 562 (1984).
Accordingly, since the estimate given the Defendants was admittedly
a valid estimate (R. at 392), Plaintiff is bound by the fact that
Prematic is also bound pursuant to its finance agreement with
Defendants.
Surely at the time Plaintiff received the application and the
premium payments Plaintiff was aware of the amount Defendants had
paid.

If there was something amiss with the premium amounts,

certainly Plaintiff would have sounded the war cry at that time.
It is apparent the only reason Plaintiff is now complaining that it
is not bound by its agent's actions is to avoid a malicious
prosecution action by Defendants.

2.
As stated

PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE PREMATIC APPLICATION AND
AGREEMENT
above, the Prematic application

executed on November 30, 1984, expressly

and agreement

states in the last

paragraph that the application is presumed accepted if no notice of
rejection is received by Defendants within thirty (30) days from
the date signed. The application was signed November 30, 1984 and
the notice of rejection was given January 22, 1985, fifty-two (52)
days after the application was signed. Since more than thirty (30)
days had passed before rejection was received, Plaintiff is bound
by the figure used in the application.
16

Plaintiff argued in the lower court that paragraph 4 of the
Prematic application and agreement provides authorization to adjust
the monthly premium deposit collected in the event of changes in
coverage or rates ordered either by the customer or the insurance
company.

(R. at 392).

This particular clause of the application and agreement cannot
be employed as attempted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never argued
that a change of "coverage or rates" ever occurred in regard to the
period of time between November 30, 1984 and February 6, 1985, the
time during which Defendants were covered by the first insurance
policy. Rather, Plaintiff's argument was that the rate was higher
to begin with.

The clause was obviously intended to provide

flexibility over the course of the contractual relationship of the
parties; it was not intended to allow Plaintiff to adjust the
estimates of its agents by any amount it wishes.

II. DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE SECOND INSURANCE POLICY.
DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE SECOND
INSURANCE POLICY BECAUSE IT WAS EXECUTED BY
SOMEONE
OTHER
THAN
DEFENDANTS
WITHOUT
DEFENDANTS' AUTHORITY.
The insurance policy on which Plaintiff based its complaint
and

first

summary

judgment

Plaintiff, the second policy.

motion

was,

as

acknowledged

by

(R. at 5, R. at 231) . As stated by

Plaintiff in it's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment: "TIE
contends that the insurance coverage for which an earned premium is
due is related to Application No. 2, received by TIE at its
Pocatello Regional Office on or about January 18, 1985, . . . "
17

Defendants had no knowledge whatsoever of the second insurance
policy.

In approximately September 1990, Plaintiff, for the first

time, presented Defendants with the second policy.

This second

policy was allegedly executed on the exact date and time as the
first policy, and is allegedly signed by Defendant Betty Olcott
(the first policy was signed by Defendant John Olcott).
signature

on the

The

second policy, however, was examined by a

handwriting expert, a Mr. Glade M. Terry, who determined that the
signature on the second policy was not signed by Defendant Betty
Olcott.

(R. at 290, See also 330)

The Affidavit of Brad Chilton, an agent of Plaintiff, states
that after Mr. England, the insurance agent, had been notified that
the first insurance policy was cancelled, Plaintiff received a
second application, the application which is the basis of this law
suit.

(R. at 237) .

Interestingly, this second application was

allegedly executed on the exact date and time as the first one;
furthermore, it was allegedly signed by a different person than the
one who signed the first application.

Plaintiff would have the

court believe that Defendants filled out two different applications
for insurance at the exact same time and each of the Defendants
signed

one

application:

that

John

Olcott

signed

the

first

application, and Betty Olcott signed the second application.
However, this is not supported by the facts.

Defendants had

never seen the second application, let alone signed it. Defendants
first became aware of the existence of the second application when
it was produced in 1990. Defendant Betty Olcott's assertion that
18

she did not sign the second application is supported by the
affidavit of Terry Glade, a handwriting expert, who stated that the
signature on the second application is inconsistent with writing
samples provided by Defendant Betty Olcott.
III. THE LOWER COURT'S RULING ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AT
ISSUE HERE CLEARLY INDICATES THE COURT'S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING
OP THE ISSUES OP THIS CASE IN GENERAL, AND SPECIFICALLY THE
ISSUES CONTAINED IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BEFORE THE
COURT
The summary judgment motion at issue here clearly requests
judgment based on the first insurance policy, which has never been
pleaded.

The first problem with the court's ruling is that it

held, in paragraph two of said ruling:
Defendants were notified by plaintiffs underwriting
department that the risk could not be written in the
particular subsidiary company at the rate indicated at
the time of binding, but that the risk could be written
in a higher risk company at a higher rate, and proceeded
to issue a policy in that company at that rate.
(R. at 512).

This holding, however,

is contradicted

by the

cancellation document sent to Defendants, dated January 22, 1985.
Said cancellation document contains the following language:
As you know, each Insurance Company has its own
eligibility rules which govern the type of risk it
insures. This means that an individual may be eligible
for insurance in one company but not necessarily in
another.
A review of your insurance has shown that it does not
conform with our present rules.
Therefore, your
insurance is cancelled effective * * * [2-6-85].
* * *

Undoubtedly you will wish to place your insurance
coverage elsewhere so this notice should allow you
sufficient time to do so before your coverage terminates
with the Exchange or Company on [2-6-85]
19

The court's ruling was inaccurate. Plaintiff informed Defendants,
via the above-mentioned cancellation document, that their insurance
was

being

cancelled

elsewhere.

and that

they

should

procure

insurance

The notice did not state that it would proceed to

insure Defendants in a different company.
However, the clearest illustration of the lower court's lack
of understanding of this case is found in paragraph five (5) of its
ruling:
The plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid portion of the
insurance premium that they claim is owed. In doing so
they have billed at the lower rate of the first, lower
risk company. That amount is $2,315.39, and appears
uncontested as to the amount, but contested as to whether
or not it is owed. This is the subject matter of this
suit and motion for summary judgment.
(R. at 512).

As has been extensively outlined previously, the

first insurance application (policy) is not, in fact, the subject
matter of this suit, as evidenced by Plaintiff's complaint and
first summary judgment motion. Rather, it is the second insurance
application which is the subject matter of this suit, as pled in
Plaintiff's complaint.

Additionally, the amount Plaintiff is

claiming is owed on the first insurance policy is not $2,315.39,
but $394.12.
Plaintiff

submitted

to

Defendants

a

purporting to comply with the court's ruling.

draft

of

an

Order

Plaintiff's draft,

however, differed in significant aspects with the court's ruling.
In contrast to the lower court's holding, Plaintiff included the
following in its draft:
1.

The earned premium which plaintiff seeks to recover;
20

2.

is based on its lower or preferred rates;

3.

and amounts to $367.21:

4.

the evidence of the calculation of the amount of the

unpaid earned premium is unrefuted and unopposed. (R. at 548).
The discrepancies were both carefully drafted and subtle.
There was no mention in the court's ruling of earned premium, but
only of unpaid portions of premiums.

Significantly, the court

specified the $2,315.39 amount was the lower rate of the first,
lower risk company, while the Order "massages" that into a lower,
preferred

rate

Additionally,

leaving

the

lower

the

company

court

held

affiliation
that

the

ambiguous.

$2,315.39

is

uncontested as to amount while the Order stated the unearned
premium is unrefuted and unopposed.

Also, the court specified in

its ruling that no attorney's fees are awarded, while the drafted
Order did not so inform.

The Order should have specifically

reflected the court's ruling.
This Court should bear in mind that Plaintiff's motive is to
avoid exposure to a malicious prosecution suit which Defendants
intend to pursue.
Defendants objected to the Order as drafted by Plaintiff, but
the lower court, in a document ambiguously titled "Memorandum,"
stated:
While the Court's discussion of its decision in behalf of
plaintiff might not have been the most articulate,
nevertheless the Court is still convinced that plaintiff
has a right to judgment for the amount of premium earned
and the other matters raised by defendant do not go to a
defense of the plaintiffs' [sic] underlying claim.
Therefore, the decision stands and plaintiff's Summary
Judgment and Order Denying New Trial, which I believe I
21

ruled on once before are signed and the matter is closed
at this trial level.
(R. at 555). The lower court's affirmation of it's decision did
not state that the amount found in it's ruling ($2,315.39) was
incorrect. Therefore, Plaintiff's Order, which changed that amount
to $394.21, was clearly inconsistent with the court's actual
ruling.
All of the above simply shows that the lower court was not
sufficiently informed as to the issues in this ccise. Specifically,
the court was not sufficiently informed on the issues contained in
the summary judgment motion, which is the basis of this appeal, to
make a correct ruling.
The correct ruling in this case would have been that there are
sufficient genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary
judgment in Plaintiff's favor.

To sum up the issues, they are as

follows:
1.

Defendants executed an insurance application on November

30, 1984, and paid the premiums applicable thereto.
2.

Plaintiff

cancelled

that

insurance

policy

due

to

Defendants' ineligibility.
3.

Defendants then procured insurance elsewhere.

4.

Thereafter, a second insurance application, which is

allegedly signed on the exact date and time as the first one,
mysteriously shows up at Plaintiff's offices in Idaho.
5.

That second application, though containing the alleged

signature of Betty Olcott, is, in fact, not hers, as evidenced by
the affidavit of a handwriting expert.
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6.

Plaintiff made demands upon Defendants for payments on

the second application, but Defendants refused to pay, not being
aware that there was a second insurance application.
7.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint based on that

second insurance application, demanding the amount of $2,315.39.
8.

Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion based on its

complaint and the second insurance application, but that motion was
denied.
9.

Plaintiff, in desperation to avoid eventual liability for

malicious prosecution, filed a second summary judgment motion based
on the first insurance policy.

Prior to filing the second motion

for summary judgment no claim or demand had ever been made for
additional premiums on the first policy.
The trial court failed to educate itself sufficiently of these
issues, and erroneously granted summary judgment for Plaintiff.

IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY WHEN THERE EXISTS NO
GENUINE ISSUE OP MATERIAL PACT AND THE MOVING PARTY IS
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OP LAW.
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of

material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power
and

Water,

Inc.,

789

P.2d

24

(Utah

1990).

"All

doubts,

uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of fact are to be
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment."

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkins, Wright &

Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984).
23

Where there is

no dispute as to any material fact, the moving party must still be
entitled to a judgment based upon the law.

Id.

In this case, not

only are there disputed material facts, but the law does not favor
Plaintiff.

Therefore,

summary

judgment

for

Plaintiff

was

erroneous.

CONCLUSION
This appeal is the result of simple and clear misunderstanding
by the lower court of the issues before it.

The summary judgment

must therefore be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this ^ ^

day of September, 1993.

/^Attorney \£

.NEJT, P.C.
fendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this
<^

day of September, 1993.
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, 11TH FLOOR
SLC, UT 84111

T^MAS^/fr^SCPflBNERf, P . C .
ttornefy f o / Defendant
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
vs.
JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET,

Case # 920002639 CV

Defendants.

The Court has received plaintiff's Summary Judgment and Order
Denying New Trial and has received defendant's Notice Of
Objection To Summary Judgment.
While the Court's discussion of its decision in behalf of
plaintiff might not have been the most articulate, nevertheless
the Court is still convinced that plaintiff has a right to
judgment for the amount of premium earned and the other matters
raised by defendant do not go to a defense of the plaintiffs'
underlying claim. Therefore, the decision stands and plaintiff's
Summary Judgment and Order Denying New Trial, which I believe I
ruled on once before are signed and the matter is closed at this
trial level.
March 25, 1993
Circuit Court Ju
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Notice of
Setting were hand delivered, X mailed postage prepaid, on the
31st day of March, 1993 to the following interested parties:
Thomas J Scribner, 2696 N University Ave., Suite 220, Provo, UT
84604
Harold C Verhaaren, 60 East South Temple, 11th Floor, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111
y
Deputy Court Clerk

WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. - 3405
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, P.C. - 4910
WATSON & SCRIBNER
Attorneys for Defendants
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, UT
84 604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP,

:

Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF OBJECTION
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

vs.

:

JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT
dba JB f S PEPPER TREE MARKET,

:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 9202639
Judge McGuire

COME NOW Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, and
objects to plaintiff's pleading entitled Summary Judgment, based on
Rules of Judicial Administration §4-504, as follows:
A.

Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's pleading is not consistant with the

ruling of the court.

The court holds in its paragraph "Five" several

holdings:
1.

plaintiff

is now

seeking

the

unpaid

portion

of

the

insurance premium they claim is owed;
2.

In doing so they have billed at the lower rate of the

first, lower risk company;
3.
4.

That amount is $2,315.39;
That amount appears uncontested

contested as to whether it is owed,

as to the amount but

5.

This is the subject matter of this suit and motion for

summary judgment.
In contrast to this holding, plaintiff drafts the following in its
order:
1. The earned premium

which plaintiff seeks to recover;

2.

is based on its lower or preferred rates;

3.

and amounts to $367.21;

4.

the evidence of the calculation of the amount of the

unpaid earned premium is unrefuted and unopposed.
The descrepancies above are both carefully drafted and subtle.
While it is obvious that plaintiff is attempting to correct the error
of the court in awarding $2,315.39 instead of the requested $367.21,
this court has determined to uphold its prior decision.

Accordingly,

the proper amount of the judgment should be $2,315.39, as directed by
the court in its ruling dated January 11, 1993.

Likewise, there is no

mention of earned premium in the courts ruling, only of unpaid portions
of premiums.

Significantly, the court specified the $2,315.39 amount

was the lower rate of the first, lower risk company, while the order
massages

that

affiliation

into

a

ambiguous.

lower,

preferred

rate

leaving

Finally, the court holds the

the

company

$2,315.39

is

uncontested as to amount while the order states the unearned premium is
unrefuted

and

unopposed.

Defendants

believe

the

order

should

specifically reflect the ruling of the court and demand the summary
judgment be drafted accordingly.
B.

Further, the court specifies no attorney's fees are awarded
2

while the drafted order does not so inform.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray this court cause the summary judgment
drafted by plaintiff be changed to correctly reflect the ruling of this
court.
DATED this

_

day of JfHZu^C^

1993.

RIBtfER, P.C.
CTSON & ^CRIBNER
attorneys for Defendant
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
oooOooo
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY OLCOTT,
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET,
Defendants.

:
:
:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:
:
:
:

Case No. CV 9202639
Judge E. Patrick McGuire

:
oooOooo

The

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

dated

December 11, 1991, came on regularly for hearing on December 8,
1992, before the Honorable E. Patrick McGuire, one of the judges of
the above-entitled court. Harold C. Verhaaren of Nielsen & Senior
appeared for the Plaintiff and Wayne B. Watson of Watson & Scribner
appeared for the Defendants.

The Court heard the argument of the

parties' respective counsel and based upon its review of the file,
as a whole, including the motion, memoranda and affidavits, issued
its written ruling dated January 11, 1993, that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the Plaintiff is entitled to

judgment against the Defendants as a matter of law.

The Court

finds that:
1.

The Defendants applied for and received commercial

insurance coverage from the Plaintiff based upon the Defendants•
application for insurance coverage.
insurance

Applications for commercial

coverage, such as the application

received

by the

Plaintiff from the Defendants, do not specify rates or premium
computations when submitted by the writing agents# but are reviewed
by the underwriting departments to evaluate the acceptability of
the risk and to determine the rate at which insurance coverage will
be provided.
2.

The Defendants were notified by the Plaintiff's

underwriting department that the risk could not be written by the
Plaintiff

at the preferred

rate estimated

at

the

time that

insurance coverage was bound, but that the risk could be written in
an affiliated higher risk company, Farmers Insurance Exchange, at
a higher premium and proceeded to issue a policy in that company at
that rate.
3.

The Defendants then obtained insurance coverage from

another insurance carrier at a rate more satisfactory to them.
4.

The Defendants were provided insurance coverage by

the Plaintiff during the period of communication, i.e. from the
date

of

tie.ol-sum.jud

their

application

for coverage

2

until

they

obtained

insurance coverage from another insurance carrier.

For that

period, a premium was earned by the Plaintiff.
5.

The earned premium which the Plaintiff now seeks to

recover is based upon its lower or preferred rates and amounts to
Three Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars and Twenty One Cents ($367.21).
The evidence of the calculation of the amount of the unpaid earned
premium at the lower rate is unrefuted and unopposed.
The Court, therefore, Orders that the Plaintiff

is

awarded judgment against the Defendants in the principal sum of
Three Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars and Twenty One Cents ($367.21)
and costs of court of Twenty Seven Dollars ($27.00), aggregating
Three Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars and Twenty-One Cents ($394.21)
together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum until paid in full.
DATED this

day of
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE E. PATRICK MCGUIRE

tie.oL-sum.jud
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, 1993.

•JM/V
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP,
R U L I N G

Plaintiff,
CASE#

vs

920002639 CV

JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT,

Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on the motion of plaintiff for
summary judgment by way of motion, affidavit and request for oral
arguments. In addition the court had the counter affidavit of
defendant. The oral arguments were heard and based upon the file
as a whole, including the motion, affidavits, and oral argument,
the Court finds and rules as follows:
One:
Defendants entered into a commercial coverage insurance
policy with plaintiffs, which policies are reviewed by their
underwriting department for applicabilty to the risk and the rate
which is not determined up front as an auto or homeowners policy
would be due to the nature of the risk and its need for
underwriting analysis.
Two:
Defendants were notified by plaintiffs' underwriting
department that the risk could not be written in the particular
subsidiary company at the rate indicated at the time of binding,
but that the risk could be written in a higher risk company at a
higher rate, and proceeded to issue a policy in that company at
that rate.
Three: Defendants were covered by the plaintiff insurer during
this period of communication and a premium was earned by plaintiff,
Four:
Defendants obtained insurance coverage from another
insurance carrier at a rate more satisfactory to them.

Five:
The plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid portion of the
insurance premium that they claim is owed. In doing so they have
billed at the lower rate of the first, lower risk company. That
amount is $2,315.39, and appears uncontested as to the amount, but
contested as to whether or not is it owed. This is the subject
matter of this suit and motion for summary judgment.
The Court rules that the plaintiff has met its burden in its
motion and that there are no material issues of fact as to the
motion for summary judgment. There were peripheral issues and
questions raised but these went more to the counterclaim which was
dismissed.
Having so found and ruled the Court instructs counsel to prepare
the appropriate papers for signature. No attorney fees are
awarded. Court costs are awarded.
DATED:

January 11, 199 3
. ^ • '

/ *

-f

•

C i r c u i t Court Jiigtge
I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing RULING were
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 11th day of January, 1993 to the
following parties.
Thomas J Scribner, 2696 N University Avenue, Suite 220, Provo, UT
84604
Harold C Verhaaren, 60 East South Temple, 11th Floor, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111

Davi Coombs
Circuit Court Clerk
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP,
Plaintiff,
RULING
vs.
Case # 920002639 CV

JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET,
Defendants.

The Court has reviewed the matter argued on December 8, 1992 and
reaffirms its ruling. Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.

February

19, 1993

f~\
Circuit Court Ji/oge

I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Notice of
Setting were hand delivered, X mailed postage prepaid, on the
"iQf-Vi
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Thomas J Scribner, 2696 North University Ave., Suite 220, Provo,
UT 84604
Harold C Verhaaren, 60 East South Temple, 11th Floor, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111

Deputy Court Clerk
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**d
is issued by &2S The Exchange or Company desigr

n
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- - ^ " A slock insurance company h«r«tn colled the Company

not;"

C»ry a n d Slate

1-22-85
INFORMATION FOR MORTGAGEE ONLY

Loan
Number
Property
Location

(If different from insured s oddrew shown b e l o w )

* If mortgage* pay* premiur
refund hat been mailed to th
mortgagee (except In Kansas
where refund has been mail*
to the insured).

insured .JOHN S BETTY OLCOTT
•DBA: JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET
•135 EAST 800 NORTH
OREM UT 8^057
AGENT S NUMBER

POLICY OR APPLICATION NUMBER

6572 64 73

76 09 170

REFUND OR AMOUNT DUE
(IF A N Y ) SEE BELOW

CANCELLATION DATE

2-6-85

*

As you know, each Insurance Company has its own eligibility rules which govern the type o
risk it insures. This means that an individual may be eligible for insurance in one company
but not necessarily in another.
A review of your insurance has shown that it does not conform with our present rules
Therefore, your insurance is cancelled effective at 12:00 NOON (12:01 A . M . in California
Oregon, Texas and fire policies in Arkansas, Washington and Idaho) on the cancellatior
date shown.
D A m o u n t due reflects any unpaid premium for the time your policy was n
force.
D Refund attached reflects any excess premium due you because of
cancellation.

thi

Undoubtedly you w i l l wish to place your insurance coverage elsewhere so this notice shoulc
allow you sufficient time to do so before your coverage terminates with the Exchange o
Company on the date indicated.
IMPORTANT NOTICE TO KANSAS POLICYHOLDERS (Applicable only to automobile insurance cancellations) Finan
cial security for every motor vehicle covered by the policy is required to be maintained continuously throughout fh
registration period The operation of any such motor vehicle without maintaining continuous financial securit
therefor is a class B misdemeanor and the registration for any such motor vehicle for which continuous financic
security is pot provided is subject to suspension and the driver's license of the owner thereof is subject to suspensior
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